Estimating the effects of potential benefit duration without variation in the maximum duration of unemployment benefits by Kyyrä, Tomi & Pesola, Hanna
Tomi Kyyrä
Hanna Pesola
Estimating the effects of potential 
benefi t duration without variation 
in the maximum duration of 
unemployment benefi ts
VATT INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH
VATT Working Papers 87
  
 
VATT WORKING PAPERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87 
Estimating the effects of  
potential benefit duration without  
variation in the maximum duration of 
unemployment benefits  
 
 
Tomi Kyyrä 
Hanna Pesola 
 
Valtion taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus 
VATT Institute for Economic Research 
Helsinki 2017 
  
 
Tomi Kyyrä, VATT Institute for Economic Research, Helsinki; IZA Bonn; 
email: tomi.kyyra@vatt.fi 
Hanna Pesola, VATT Institute for Economic Research, Helsinki;  
email: hanna.pesola@vatt.fi 
 
 
 
 
We would like to thank Jouko Verho for his help with the data, and Essi Eerola 
and Eva Österbacka for their comments. We gratefully acknowledge research 
funding from the Academy of Finland (Grant 133930). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 978-952-274-194-3 (PDF) 
 
ISSN 1798-0291 (PDF) 
 
 
Valtion taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus 
VATT Institute for Economic Research 
Arkadiankatu 7, 00100 Helsinki, Finland 
 
Helsinki, May 2017 
  
 
Estimating the effects of potential benefit duration without 
variation in the maximum duration of unemployment 
benefits  
 
VATT Institute for Economic Research 
VATT Working Papers 87/2017  
 
Tomi Kyyrä – Hanna Pesola 
 
Abstract  
This paper examines the effects of unemployment benefit duration in Finland. To 
overcome the problem that the maximum duration of benefits is the same for all 
unemployed we exploit two observations. First, despite the uniform maximum 
benefit period, potential benefit duration at the beginning of unemployment 
spells varies across individuals because only those with sufficient work history in 
the past two years qualify for a new period of benefits whereas others may be 
entitled to unused benefit days from a previous spell. Second, part of this 
variation is exogenous due to a reform that reduced the minimum number of 
employment weeks required for the new benefit period. Using the exogenous part 
of the variation for identification we estimate that one extra week of benefits 
increases expected unemployment duration by 0.15 weeks, which corresponds to 
an elasticity of 0.5. We also find positive effects on the quality of the next job, 
especially when measured by job stability. 
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1 Introduction
One of the key questions in the unemployment insurance (UI) literature is how the length
of the beneﬁt period aﬀects the duration of unemployment spells and the quality of subse-
quent job matches. A major challenge of causal inference is to ﬁnd exogenous variation in
the length of the beneﬁt period. The most convincing studies have relied either on discon-
tinuities in the beneﬁt rule that determines the length of the beneﬁt period as a function
of age and/or work history (e.g. Card et al. 2007; Schmieder et al. 2012; Caliendo et al.
2013; Lalive 2007; Le Barbanchon 2016; Lalive 2008) or policy changes that extended or
reduced the beneﬁt period for some group of the unemployed but did not aﬀect other
groups (e.g. Hunt 1995; van Ours and Vodopivec 2006; Lalive et al. 2006). The regres-
sion discontinuity approach can be applied only in the case of certain countries where
the length of the entitlement period varies across worker groups (e.g. Germany, Austria,
Italy and Portugal).1 A common problem with the policy reforms is that the beneﬁt pe-
riods are often extended in response to recessions (e.g. the federal- and state-level beneﬁt
extension programs in the U.S.) or to the relatively poor employment development of a
certain worker group, so that the policy changes themselves are endogenous (Card and
Levine, 2000; Lalive and Zweimüller, 2004). Large-scale reforms may also have spillover
eﬀects on those who are not directly aﬀected through search externalities (Levine 1993;
Lalive et al. 2015). In the case of Finland, neither of these approaches can be applied.
In Finland, the maximum duration of UI beneﬁts remained at 100 weeks for all unem-
ployed for several decades up until 2013.2 As there has been no variation in the maximum
beneﬁt duration that one could have exploited for identiﬁcation in the analysis, no em-
pirical evidence on the eﬀects of potential beneﬁt duration exists for Finland. This is
particularly unfortunate at the times when the Finnish UI scheme is being reformed. The
reforms implemented so far have involved quite substantial reductions in the length of
the entitlement period. In 2014, the maximum beneﬁt duration was reduced by 20 weeks
for those with less than three years of work experience. This was followed by a general
1The regression discontinuity approach is not immune to confounding factors either. First, the running
variable (e.g. work history) that determines eligibility for an extended beneﬁt period may be measured
with error which can bias the results unless beneﬁt eligibility is directly observed in the data. Second,
workers (and perhaps also their employers) have an incentive to manipulate the timing of unemployment
entry in such a way that the beneﬁt claimant qualiﬁes for a longer beneﬁt period. Finally, behavior of
the unemployed just below the eligibility threshold provides a poor counterfactual if they can establish
eligibility for a longer beneﬁt period by taking up a very short job.
2There is an exception for the oldest unemployed as those exceeding a given age threshold before their
regular UI beneﬁt expire may qualify for extended beneﬁts until retirement. In practice, this scheme
acts as an early retirement scheme for many unemployed workers, some of whom self-select themselves
into the program. Kyyrä and Wilke (2007) show that the unemployment risk of private-sector workers
at least doubles at the age threshold of this scheme, and Kyyrä and Ollikainen (2008) estimate that
approximately one half of unemployed workers eligible for the beneﬁt extension withdraw from job search
entirely.
2
reduction of 20 weeks that came into eﬀect at the beginning of 2017. Together these
two changes have shortened the maximum beneﬁt period by 20% for the majority of the
people and by 40% for those with less than three years of work experience. Given the long
entitlement periods in Finland and the fact that the new rules only aﬀect new UI spells,
it will take some time before we will have access to data with a suﬃciently long follow-up
period to evaluate the eﬀects of these reforms. Meanwhile, we propose and apply a novel
approach to estimate the causal eﬀects of potential beneﬁt duration in the absence of
variation in the maximum beneﬁt period.
In Finland, an unemployed worker who has worked for a certain minimum number of
weeks during the past two years is awarded a new period of UI beneﬁts (500 payment
days or 100 calendar weeks prior to 2014). A worker who enters unemployment without
satisfying this employment condition may still be entitled to UI beneﬁts if he or she has
unused UI days from a previous unemployment spell. Within this group the remaining
beneﬁt entitlement can be anything between 0 and 499 days, being 0 for those who ex-
hausted their UI beneﬁts in the past and for those who have not received UI beneﬁts
before. Thus, even though the maximum entitlement period is the same for all unem-
ployed, there is variation in potential beneﬁt duration at the beginning of unemployment
spells among workers with somewhat sporadic employment histories. Obviously this vari-
ation alone does not permit causal inference because it is completely driven by diﬀerences
in labor market histories.
To identify the causal eﬀects we take advantage of a change in the employment condi-
tion that reduced the minimum number of employment weeks required for renewal of the
entitlement period in 2003. As a result of the reform, workers who satisﬁed the new but
not the old employment condition became eligible for UI beneﬁts for diﬀerent periods of
time depending on the date of their unemployment entry, whereas other workers were not
aﬀected by the reform. Provided that the change in the employment condition did not af-
fect the unemployment inﬂow, the resulting variation in the length of beneﬁt entitlement
within the aﬀected group is exogenous and thus the causal eﬀects of potential beneﬁt
duration can be identiﬁed. Since the reform aﬀected only a relatively small fraction of all
UI recipients, we are not worried about the confounding spillover eﬀects.
We use comprehensive data that combines information from various administrative
registers. A particular feature of the data is that we can keep track of the number of
remaining UI days over time. In particular, we observe the number of available beneﬁt
days at the beginning of the current unemployment spell (i.e. potential beneﬁt duration)
as well as the number of unused beneﬁt days at the end of the previous spell, if any (i.e.
counterfactual beneﬁt duration if the employment condition is not satisﬁed). We clas-
sify workers who became unemployed between 2000 and 2004 into groups deﬁned by the
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number of employment weeks and the number of unused UI days from the previous spell.
These groups were aﬀected diﬀerently by the 2003 change in the employment condition.
The groups where employment weeks exceed the new but not the old threshold of the
employment condition are the most likely to experience a notable increase in potential
beneﬁt duration after 2003. Moreover, within these groups, the average increase in po-
tential beneﬁt duration is larger for those with fewer UI days from the previous spell.
Under the assumption that the expected value of unobserved characteristics in diﬀerent
groups follows the same trend, we can estimate the eﬀects of potential beneﬁt duration
by comparing changes in the unemployment outcomes over time across diﬀerent groups.
Our ﬁndings indicate that one additional week of UI beneﬁts increases the expected
duration of compensated unemployment by some 0.15 weeks, corresponding to an elas-
ticity of 0.5. This eﬀect appears to be fairly homogeneous, as the absolute eﬀect varies
between 0.10 and 0.22 weeks across various subgroups of workers. The eﬀect is quite
similar for women and men, for diﬀerent education groups, and for private- and public-
sector employees, as well as for those facing diﬀerent labor market conditions. However,
workers aged 45 and over and those with relatively high UI beneﬁts may be somewhat
more responsive to changes in the length of the beneﬁt period.
We ﬁnd evidence that longer beneﬁt periods improve the quality of the ﬁrst post-
unemployment job: one additional week of beneﬁts is estimated to increase the expected
wage and duration of the next job by some 2 Euros a month and 0.15 weeks, respectively.
The former eﬀect is very small, corresponding to an elasticity of 0.06, whereas the latter
eﬀect is economically signiﬁcant with an elasticity of 0.19. The eﬀect on quality of next
job varies across groups, being close to zero in many cases. Women, low educated and
private-sector employees are the most likely to beneﬁt in terms of higher wages or more
stable jobs from the longer job search periods that longer beneﬁt periods enable.
Our study makes three contributions. First, we provide ﬁrst evidence on the eﬀect
of potential beneﬁt duration on unemployment duration for Finland. Tatsiramos and
van Ours (2014) summarize the ﬁndings of the previous studies for other countries by
concluding that a one week increase in the potential beneﬁt duration typically prolongs
average unemployment duration by approximately 0.2 weeks. Although our approach
diﬀers from the previous studies that exploit exogenous variation in the maximum beneﬁt
duration, our estimate of 0.15 is of the same magnitude. Second, our study contributes
to the literature on the eﬀect of potential beneﬁt duration on quality of subsequent job
matches. This literature has produced mixed results, some studies ﬁnding small positive
eﬀects on subsequent wages or job stability while others report small negative eﬀects or
no eﬀects at all. Our results for Finland are rather encouraging as we do ﬁnd evidence of
some positive impacts on match quality.
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Finally, we show that it may be possible to estimate the causal eﬀects of potential
beneﬁt duration even when there is no variation in the maximum beneﬁt duration. In
most countries, beneﬁt eligibility depends on the record of past employment and awarded
beneﬁts can be collected over several unemployment spells. In these cases, the approach
proposed here can be applied provided that the eligibility rules have changed over time.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the Finnish
UI system during the period under investigation and describes the reform in 2003. This
is followed by a section describing our data and sample restrictions. Section 4 presents
descriptive evidence to support the validity of our research design and likely eﬀects of
potential beneﬁt duration. Section 5 describes the econometric model and reports the
estimation results along with the results of robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional setting
2.1 Unemployment insurance in Finland
Earnings-related UI beneﬁts are paid by unemployment funds. Membership in these funds
is voluntary, but as many as 90% of employed workers were members in 2015. A worker
who lost his or her job qualiﬁes for 100 weeks of UI beneﬁts (500 weekdays) provided that
he or she (i) has registered as an unemployed job seeker at the public employment service,
(ii) has been a member of an unemployment fund for at least ten months (membership
condition), and (iii) has worked for a minimum number of weeks in a certain time interval
(employment condition). Workers who are 57 years or older on the day when their regular
UI beneﬁts expire are entitled to extended beneﬁts until retirement.
The level of UI beneﬁts has no cap but the replacement rate declines rapidly with the
level of past earnings. If the beneﬁt recipient leaves unemployment without exhausting
his or her beneﬁts, and then returns to unemployment before satisfying the employment
condition again, he or she will be entitled to unused UI beneﬁts from the previous spell
(given that he or she did not leave the labor market for a period longer than six months
without an acceptable reason). Those who exhaust their UI beneﬁts can claim a means-
tested, ﬂat-rate labor market subsidy, which is paid by the Social Security Institution for
an indeﬁnite period.3
Participants of labor market training programs receive a training subsidy, which equals
the unemployment beneﬁt the worker would have otherwise received. Furthermore, an
3Those unemployed who do not belong to an unemployment fund but satisfy the employment condition
are eligible for a ﬂat-rate basic allowance which is the same amount as the labor market subsidy and
which is paid for a period of 500 days without means testing. In practice, this beneﬁt type is of minor
importance and their recipients are not covered in our analysis.
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unemployed worker who takes up a part-time job or a very short full-time job may be
entitled to a reduced amount of beneﬁts, i.e. partial beneﬁts. The entitlement period
for a worker on partial UI beneﬁts elapses at a reduced rate proportional to the ratio of
the partial beneﬁt to full-time beneﬁt. Thus, the unemployed can collect earnings-related
beneﬁts longer than 100 weeks due to part-time unemployment and participation in the
labor market training programs.
2.2 The 2003 change in the employment condition
Before 2003, the employment condition was met if the beneﬁt claimant had worked and
made contributions to an unemployment fund for at least 43 weeks (contribution weeks)
within the past 24 months (review period). During each contribution week the claimant
had to have worked for 18 hours or more. For those unemployed who had renewed their
UI entitlement last time within two years prior to the current spell, the review period
was shorter and deﬁned as the time between the end of the previous UI spell and the
end of the job preceding the current spell. On the other hand, the length of the review
period could also be extended if the claimant had been outside the labor force for some
acceptable reason, such as illness, military service or taking care of a young child at the
home.
In 2003, the minimum number of contribution weeks required for renewal of the 500-
day entitlement period was reduced from 43 to 34. For ﬁrst-time beneﬁt claimants the
minimum number of weeks did not change but remained at 43, yet the review period over
which these weeks could be collected was extended by four months to 28 months for this
group. For technical reasons, the group of ﬁrst-time claimants was deﬁned as those who
had not received UI beneﬁts after 1996.
The change in the employment condition was part of the renewal of the Unemployment
Compensation Act. This new law was oﬃcially proposed by the government on September
13, 2002, and it came into eﬀect on January 1, 2003. According to the government's
law proposal, the main objective of the reform was to simplify legislation by clarifying
certain rules and collecting them into a single law. The motivation for relaxing the
employment condition mentioned in the law proposal was to encourage the unemployed
to take up short-term jobs and to help those with diﬃculties in ﬁnding stable jobs to
renew their beneﬁt eligibility. That is, the 2003 reform was not a response to a change
in macroeconomic conditions, which were quite stable at that time yet slightly improving
over the later years. The GDP growth rate was around 2% in 20012003 but it roughly
doubled for the next few years. The unemployment rate was 9.1% in 2001 and 2002, after
which it slowly reduced to 7.7% by 2006.
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2.3 Other simultaneous changes
In addition to the change in the employment condition, the new law in 2003 involved some
other minor changes that aﬀected UI generosity. First, the severance pay system was
abolished and replaced by a higher UI beneﬁt that could be paid for the ﬁrst 150 days of
unemployment.4 Eligibility criteria for the severance pay and higher beneﬁt were slightly
diﬀerent but they were both targeted at older workers who were laid oﬀ for economic
reasons after a long working career. Due to rather strict eligibility criteria, a relatively
small share of all UI recipients qualiﬁed for these payments. In the empirical analysis,
we focus on workers who became unemployed after a relatively short job spell, usually at
the end of a ﬁxed-term contract. As a result, the share of individuals entitled to higher
beneﬁts based on a long working career is very small in our data (less than 2%). Second,
the beneﬁt level was increased for the oldest unemployed who receive extended beneﬁts
after exhausting their regular UI beneﬁts. This age group is excluded from our analysis.
Third, the maximum length of a temporary full-time job qualifying for partial beneﬁts
was reduced from four to two weeks, which may have increased part-time unemployment
somewhat. In the empirical analysis we consider workers who received full-time beneﬁts
after a job loss. Some of them moved from full-time beneﬁt into partial beneﬁts at a
later point (3.1% in our estimation sample), in which case the period of partial beneﬁts
is treated as a part of the overall unemployment spell. Finally, there was also an earlier
reform on March 1, 2002, which increased the beneﬁt level of all UI recipients. Since all
these other changes aﬀected all UI recipients in the same way, they should not distort our
analysis that is based on a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences setting.
3 Data
3.1 Data sources
Our data was compiled by merging information from various administrative registers.
The register on job seekers, maintained by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy,
covers all job seekers at the public employment service. One cannot receive unemployment
beneﬁts without being registered as an unemployed job seeker, which means that all
beneﬁt recipients should be included in the register. This register contains information
on registered job search spells and participation in various active labor market programs,
4Also this change was meant to simplify the system (as the severance pay and UI beneﬁts were paid
by diﬀerent institutions) rather than to change beneﬁt generosity. Indeed, the size of the beneﬁt increase
(about 15% on average) was chosen in a such way that the amount of the cumulative beneﬁt increase over
150 days roughly equals the abolished severance pay for an average recipient. See Uusitalo and Verho
(2010) for an evaluation of the eﬀect of the beneﬁt increase.
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as well as demographic characteristics of job seekers. However, it does not contain any
information on receipt of unemployment beneﬁts, nor on regular job spells.
While the UI beneﬁts are paid by individual unemployment funds, each fund reports
the beneﬁts it paid out to the Insurance Supervisory Authority on a quarterly basis.
From the beneﬁt register of this authority we obtain information on unemployment fund
membership, UI beneﬁts received and earnings-related training subsidies. Along with
daily beneﬁts the records also contain information on the remaining UI entitlement at
the end of each quarter. With this information we can keep track of the number of
remaining UI days over time. From the Social Security Institution we obtain corresponding
information on ﬂat-rate unemployment beneﬁts and training subsidies.
For all unemployed individuals we merge employment and earnings information from
the registers of the Finnish Centre for Pensions, which is a statutory co-operation body
of all providers of earnings-related pensions in Finland. It keeps comprehensive records
on job spells and earnings for the entire Finnish population, which are used to determine
pension beneﬁts. We use this information to construct a measure for the number of con-
tribution weeks, to detect exits to employment and to determine the wages and durations
of jobs held before and after the unemployment spell.
We deﬁne an unemployment spell as the time the worker collects unemployment-
related beneﬁts. More precisely, we combine sequential spells of beneﬁt receipt that are
no more than four weeks apart by treating such beneﬁt periods as part of the same
unemployment spell but ignoring the days without beneﬁts between the beneﬁt periods.
The time spent in labor market training courses and on partial beneﬁts is counted as part
of the unemployment spell. The resulting unemployment spell may thus include periods
on diﬀerent types of beneﬁts. For example, a worker may ﬁrst receive UI beneﬁts, then
the training subsidy for the duration of a training course, and ﬁnally end up on labor
market subsidy after exhausting his or her UI beneﬁts.
The unemployment spell may end with a transition to regular work, a job placement
program (i.e. subsidized work) or nonparticipation. The register on job seekers contains
information on periods of subsidized employment. It also includes information on exits to
regular jobs that applicants found themselves or through the referrals of the employment
authorities. However, this information on job ﬁndings is not complete as the exit reason
is often missing for those who found a new job on their own. For these reasons, the exits
to regular work are detected by comparing the ending dates of the unemployment spells
and the starting dates of job spells. Only exits to jobs with a duration of at least four
weeks and monthly wage no less than 500 Euros are classiﬁed as job ﬁndings.
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3.2 Sample
We consider unemployment spells that started in 20012004 after a job loss. We require
that the duration of the last job was at least four weeks and the job ended within four weeks
prior to the beneﬁt claim (this eliminates voluntary quits). We further limit our analysis
to individuals between the ages of 25 and 54 who have been a member of an unemployment
fund for at least two years, who have received UI beneﬁts after 1996 and who have been
in the labor force for at least 90% of the time during the past two years without being
self-employed or hired with a wage subsidy. The age restriction eliminates older workers
entitled to extended beneﬁts. The UI history condition guarantees that workers with
3442 contribution weeks were aﬀected by the law change. Other restrictions are imposed
to improve the accuracy of our measure of the number of the contribution weeks. This
variable is diﬃcult to measure because we do not observe working hours and because the
review period may be extended for various reasons, and due to the complexity of the rules
regarding how self-employment and subsidized employment are treated. Despite these
sample restrictions, the estimated number of contribution weeks remains subject to some
measurement error, as we illustrate below.
After the change in the employment condition in 2003, workers with 3442 contribution
weeks became eligible for a new period of UI beneﬁts for 100 weeks. Therefore, we can
compare unemployment outcomes within this treatment group over time, using some
other group whose eligibility status was not aﬀected by the reform as a comparison
group. The most natural candidate for the latter group are workers who are similar
to our treatment group members. We consider two such groups: workers with 2033
contribution weeks and those with 4360 weeks. Thus, we limit our econometric analysis
to workers with 2060 contribution weeks. Because the law change was proposed on
September 13, 2002, we also drop spells that started on that date or later in 2002 as
they may have been subject to anticipatory behavior. The ﬁnal sample consists of 60,295
unemployment spells. In the descriptive analysis we do not necessarily impose these
sample restrictions but consider all workers with 4104 contribution weeks who became
unemployed in 20012004 provided that they satisfy the age and labor market history
conditions listed above.
4 Descriptive evidence
4.1 The 2003 reform and unemployment inﬂow
One concern in our analysis is that the change in the employment condition may have
aﬀected the unemployment inﬂow, in which case workers with a given number of contribu-
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Figure 1: Monthly ﬂow from employment to unemployment by the number of contribution
weeks at the beginning of the unemployment spell
tion weeks who entered unemployment before and after the reform may be systematically
diﬀerent. Figure 1 shows the unemployment inﬂow decomposed into the three groups ac-
cording to the number of contribution weeks. There is a large degree of seasonal variation
in the inﬂow and the seasonal pattern varies between the groups. In all groups the inﬂow
drops by more than 50% from January to February. The inﬂow rate of individuals with
less than 34 contribution weeks increases smoothly from February onward and stabilizes
at a high level for the last quarter. For the other two groups, the inﬂow rates are also
relatively low from February to May but peak at the start of the summer period and
remain at higher levels for the second half of the year. Whereas the inﬂow rate of those
with at least 43 contribution weeks roughly doubles in June and July from May, the peak
in June is particularly pronounced for those with 3442 contribution weeks (our treatment
group), among whom the inﬂow rate more than quadruples from May to June having ﬁrst
nearly doubled from April to May. It follows that 26% of all spells of the treatment group
started in June compared to 8% in the group with less than 34 contribution weeks and
14% in the group with more than 42 contribution weeks.
Apart from the seasonal variation, the inﬂow rates were stable around the time of
the 2003 reform. This reﬂects partly the fact that the unemployment rate and economic
environment were relatively stable in Finland at that time. Furthermore, given the lack
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Figure 2: Distribution of contribution weeks by unemployment entry period. Pre-
reform spells started in 20012002 before September 13, 2002, and post-reform spells
in 20032004.
of notable changes in the inﬂow in 2003 between the groups, it is unlikely that the reform
had an impact on the unemployment inﬂow. If satisfying the employment condition
increased the exit rate from employment to unemployment, we should see an increase in
the unemployment inﬂow for workers with 3442 contribution weeks and a decline for
those with more than 42 contribution weeks, but we do not see evidence of such an eﬀect
in ﬁgure 1. To examine this possibility more carefully we compare the distributions of the
contribution weeks between those who became unemployed before and after the reform in
ﬁgure 2. If employed workers time their unemployment entry according to the employment
condition rules, we should see a mass point on the right-hand side of the threshold value of
43 weeks in the pre-reform distribution, and this mass point should have moved towards
the new threshold value of 34 weeks after the reform. No such evidence is seen in ﬁgure 2.
Instead, the pre- and post-reform distributions are very similar, suggesting that employed
workers or their employers did not change their behavior in response to the law change.
In addition to the spike at 43 contribution weeks, there is bunching of observations
on the wrong side of the old threshold value. Given that the mass of the observations
between 41 and 43 weeks did not vanish in the post-reform period, it is likely to be
unrelated to the employment condition. Nor can it be explained by measurement error
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Figure 3: Distribution of contribution weeks by unemployment entry period without spells
starting in June. Pre-reform spells started in 20012002 before September 13, 2002, and
post-reform spells in 20032004.
because the vast majority of individuals with 41 or 42 contribution weeks in the pre-
reform period did not satisfy the employment condition according to the UI records (this
is illustrated in ﬁgure 4 below). It turns out that the mass point can be attributed to
individuals who entered unemployment in June. The mass point disappears altogether
when we drop the individuals who became unemployed in June, as shown in ﬁgure 3.
About 40% of the unemployment entrants in June with 41 or 42 weeks are female health
care or social workers from the public sector. Most of these workers return to their
previous employer (typically already in August), even though temporarily laid oﬀ workers
with a valid employment contract are excluded from the sample.
We have also compared the contribution week distributions separately for workers
who were laid oﬀ and those whose ﬁxed-term contract ended. As a further robustness
check, we have examined the distributions of the duration of the previous job for all
unemployed workers as well as for the subgroups who became unemployed for diﬀerent
reasons. None of these analyses indicates that the timing of the unemployment entry
from employment would have changed in response to the 2003 reform. As such, it seems
evident that workers do not leave employment for unemployment at a higher rate once
their contribution weeks exceed the threshold value of the employment condition. Nor do
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the employers target dismissals at those employees who would be entitled to the maximum
duration of UI beneﬁts.
4.2 Beneﬁt entitlement over time by group
We do not directly observe the contribution weeks in our data but calculate them using
information on job spells. Despite the sample restrictions discussed earlier, some incon-
sistencies in the information obtained from the diﬀerent registers remains. In particular,
the number of contribution weeks from the job spell data do not always match the UI
records which are supposed to be highly reliable. To illustrate this we depict the fraction
of unemployment entrants who qualiﬁed for 100 weeks of beneﬁts (500 UI days) according
to the beneﬁt records as a function of contribution weeks computed from the employment
records for the spells starting before and after the 2003 reform in ﬁgure 4a. In the absence
of measurement errors, the share of the unemployed who renewed their entitlement period
should be 0% until the threshold of 34 or 43 weeks depending on the entry period, and
100% thereafter. As seen in ﬁgure 4a, this is not the case and the degree of classiﬁcation
errors is about 15% for the individuals with 3442 contribution weeks.
Figure 4b shows the renewal rate by the month of unemployment entry for three
contribution week groups. The fraction of those qualifying for 100 weeks of UI beneﬁts in
our treatment group increases sharply at the time of the reform, ending up close to the
level of workers with 4360 weeks. The renewal rate for workers with 2033 weeks also
increases over time (because those whose latent true contribution weeks are between 34
and 42 renewed their entitlement period in the post-reform period) but to a much lesser
extent. The renewal rates of these two groups increased already in late 2002, i.e. before
the new law came into eﬀect. This is because the new rules may have been applied to the
spells that were ongoing on January 1, 2003.
When measured by the number of UI weeks the individual is entitled to at the start
of the unemployment spell, the diﬀerences between groups are less drastic, especially
around the threshold values of the employment condition (ﬁgures 4c). It appears that
people typically have many unused UI weeks from the previous unemployment spell (65
weeks on average), suggesting they have experienced short UI spells in the past. As a
result, workers are often entitled to long beneﬁt periods even if they do not satisfy the
employment condition.
As pointed out above, our data includes a speciﬁc subgroup of individuals who typi-
cally entered unemployment in June, stayed unemployed for the summer period and then
returned to employment in August. Having been unemployed only during the summer
weeks of the previous year these workers have 41 or 42 contribution weeks and a large
number of unused UI weeks (87 on average). The presence of this group explains the long
13
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potential beneﬁt duration at 42 contribution weeks before the reform period in ﬁgure 4c,
as well as the spikes in June for the treatment group in ﬁgure 4d.
As the macroeconomic environment improved over the years, workers who became
unemployed in the later years have experienced shorter UI spells in the past and, therefore,
have more unused UI weeks at the beginning of the current spell. The average number of
unused UI weeks increased from 2001 to 2004 by 3, 5 and 7 weeks for groups with 2033,
3442 and 4360 contributions weeks respectively. This explains modest increasing trends
in the potential beneﬁt duration for those with 2033 contribution weeks over all years, as
well as for the treatment group over the pre-reform period. The improving macroeconomic
conditions have less impact on the potential beneﬁt duration of workers with 4360 weeks
who should qualify for 100 weeks of UI beneﬁts in all years, so that all the variation
within this group is due to erroneously classifying workers who actually have less than 43
contribution weeks into the group.
The key insight from ﬁgure 4 is that despite the measurement error in the contribution
week variable, the average potential beneﬁt duration in the treatment group changed
markedly at the time of the reform compared to the other groups. This is the variation
we exploit for identiﬁcation in the econometric analysis.
4.3 Labor market outcomes over time by group
Figure 5 shows average outcomes by group and month of unemployment entry.5 The
unemployment spells were shortest for the treatment group up until the summer of 2002.
After September 2002, the average length of the beneﬁt period increased in the treatment
group compared to the other groups (ﬁgures 4b and 4d), which may indicate that the
increasing average unemployment duration of the treatment group after the reform was
caused by longer beneﬁt periods. The lack of diﬀerences in the unemployment duration
already in August and September 2002 does not ﬁt the story, but that is likely to be
driven by diﬀerential seasonal patterns as there were no diﬀerences in the same months
in 2001 either.6
The average unemployment duration of workers with 2033 weeks increases over time
compared to the group with 4360 weeks. At a glance, this may seem worrisome re-
garding the parallel trend assumption we need in our analysis, but it may arise from the
diﬀerential trends in the potential beneﬁt duration between the groups in ﬁgure 4d. The
5To eliminate a few outliers we censor the unemployment spells at 120 weeks (2.2% of observations),
the subsequent job spells at 6.5 years (3.5% of the re-employed) and the post-unemployment wages at
the 99th percentile by replacing the higher values with these cutoﬀ values.
6When the seasonality-adjusted time series are used, the average unemployment duration is uniformly
lowest for the treatment group up until September 2002, after which no systematic diﬀerences between
the groups exist.
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average beneﬁt duration of workers with 2033 weeks increases over time in comparison
to those with 4360 weeks, which should reduce the diﬀerence in the average unemploy-
ment duration between the groups provided that longer beneﬁt periods lead to longer
unemployment spells.
Another measure of successful job search is the probability that the unemployment
spell will eventually end with a new job. In ﬁgure 5b, we do not see much diﬀerence in
the fraction of spells ending in employment between the groups, nor any changes after the
reform. In each group, roughly three-quarters of the spells are followed by employment.
About one half of the re-employed returned to their previous employer, even though
temporarily laid oﬀ workers with a valid employment contract are excluded from the
sample. This does not only apply to the workers selected into the analysis, but also to
all unemployed, albeit the share of recalls is somewhat smaller in the whole population.
Furthermore, 5% to 7% of exits are to job replacement programs, and roughly 10% to
nonparticipation. In the rest of the cases, i.e. for slightly less than 10% of the spells,
the exit destination is less clear (e.g. a combination of inactivity and a marginal job that
lasted for less than four weeks).
We also consider two measures of match quality: the wage and duration of the ﬁrst
post-unemployment job for those who found a job with a duration of no less than four
weeks. These measures are rather similar for all groups and in all periods in ﬁgures 5c and
5d. The new jobs are often relatively long lasting as the average duration is close to one
year, but the distribution of job duration is very skewed and, therefore, the median job
duration is much less, being 23 weeks. The average match quality of subsequent jobs has
declined over time despite improving macroeconomic conditions. A closer look at these
changes shows that the average wage and duration of the next job increased from 2001
to 2002, and then dropped in 2003. Although the annual changes are small, they suggest
the possibility that the more lenient employment condition taking eﬀect in 2003 may have
encouraged the unemployed to be less picky about available jobs.
To sum up, the pre-reform trends in ﬁgure 5 are highly similar for diﬀerent groups,
and the changes in the average unemployment duration between the groups over time are
consistent with the hypothesis that longer beneﬁt periods cause longer spells of unem-
ployment. On the other hand, there is no clear visual evidence implying that the beneﬁt
duration would aﬀect other outcomes than the unemployment duration. Yet the average
changes between the two periods for diﬀerent groups show that the match quality of the
subsequent jobs declined slightly less in the treatment group than in the other two groups.
17
4.4 Sample means by group and period
Table 1 reports average background characteristics (panel A) and outcomes (panel B)
for various groups by period of unemployment entry. All three groups in the estimation
sample are rather similar in terms of most background characteristics, albeit those with
3442 and 4360 weeks are closer to each other. Workers with 2033 weeks are slightly
less educated, more often male and their past job was more often in the private sector
compared to those in the other two groups. Health care and social work occupations and,
consequently, municipal employees are slightly over-represented in the treatment group.
There are no notable diﬀerences in the past wage, nor in the level of UI beneﬁts between
the groups.
Workers with 2033 contribution weeks have been employed for fewer weeks and have
been unemployed for more weeks during the past two years than those in the other two
groups. However, there are hardly any diﬀerences in employment and unemployment
weeks over the past two years between those with 3442 and 4360 contribution weeks,
even though the latter group has worked more during the review period of the employment
condition by construction. As pointed out previously, the treatment group contains a
speciﬁc group of workers who enter unemployment in June. These workers experience
typically only one short unemployment episode in the summer while being employed for
the rest of the year. The existence of this group, which is relatively large and has a lot
of employment weeks in the past two years, explains the relatively high employment and
relatively low unemployment ﬁgures for the treatment group.
Around 90% of workers in all groups have at least some unused UI beneﬁts from
the previous spell. On average, these beneﬁts would be available for 6070 weeks if the
employment conditions were not met. This explains why almost all workers also in the
control group with 2033 contributions weeks and in the pre-reform treatment group are
entitled to UI beneﬁts and for a relatively long time on average.
Within the treatment group, the average duration of unemployment is 1.6 weeks longer
for spells that started in 20032004 than for spells that started in 20012002 before
September 13, 2002 (panel B). Over the same period the average unemployment duration
decreased by 0.6 weeks for those with 2033 contribution weeks and by 2.1 weeks for those
with 4360 contribution weeks. The average monthly wage of subsequent jobs is around
2,100 Euros compared to some 2,600 Euros in the previous jobs. However, the average
wage decline compared to the previous wage among the re-employed is only about 5%
for those with 2033 contribution weeks and even less for the other two groups. The
average re-employment wage dropped by 59 Euros from the pre- to post-reform period
in the treatment group and marginally more in the control groups (62 and 69 Euros).
The average duration of subsequent jobs declined by 1.9 weeks after the reform in the
18
Table 1: Sample means by group and unemployment entry period
Estimation sample by contribution weeks All
20 to 33 34 to 42 43 to 60 spells
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Background characteristics
Age 41.2 41.2 40.4 40.6 40.4 40.7 40.5 40.6
Female, % 50.2 50.7 55.7 58.5 55.0 54.8 52.2 54.5
Education, %
Comprehensive 34.1 32.4 28.8 26.9 30.2 28.3 30.6 28.0
Secondary 58.9 60.3 59.8 61.3 58.3 60.4 59.7 61.4
Tertiary 7.0 7.4 11.5 11.8 11.5 11.3 9.7 10.6
Occupation, %
Engineering 11.0 10.9 16.4 16.7 15.6 15.3 14.1 14.1
Health care/social work 13.4 13.7 19.3 21.3 16.8 15.8 15.6 16.5
Administration 8.5 8.2 7.8 8.1 8.7 7.6 9.5 9.4
Commercial 4.9 5.0 3.9 4.4 4.8 4.8 5.0 5.1
Agricultural 7.8 8.7 4.5 5.3 5.4 7.9 5.0 5.6
Transport 4.2 3.9 3.4 3.1 3.2 2.9 3.8 3.5
Construction 17.0 15.9 14.6 12.6 15.4 16.1 15.8 14.0
Industrial 20.3 20.8 17.8 16.4 18.0 16.7 19.0 18.8
Services 11.1 11.3 10.7 10.7 10.5 11.3 10.7 11.4
Other 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5
Weeks within 24 months
Employed 53.7 54.5 62.9 62.6 62.7 63.8 63.5 63.3
Unemployed 48.9 48.2 39.9 40.2 40.0 38.9 39.3 39.5
Contribution weeks 26.8 26.6 38.6 38.8 50.5 50.3 43.4 41.7
Previous job
Public sector, % 27.2 27.2 40.9 42.4 36.6 32.8 32.5 33.1
Private sector, % 72.8 72.8 59.1 57.6 63.4 67.2 67.5 66.9
Duration, weeks 17.1 17.3 23.6 24.0 26.2 27.2 25.9 26.0
Monthly wage, Euros 2,638 2,624 2,585 2,541 2,591 2,580 2,615 2,570
Unused UI weeks > 0, % 91.6 92.7 92.3 92.7 89.9 92.0 88.5 90.9
Unused UI weeks 64.6 67.8 67.4 68.5 59.5 63.0 63.3 66.8
UI recipient, % 91.9 93.5 93.6 97.5 97.8 98.8 95.0 96.1
Renew UI entitlement, % 4.2 12.5 15.4 77.5 78.0 85.2 38.4 47.5
Potential UI duration, wks 66.1 71.6 72.9 91.0 90.9 93.7 79.7 83.7
Daily UI beneﬁt, Euros 62.5 63.2 62.0 63.7 63.5 64.3 63.8 64.4
B. Outcomes
Unemployment duration, wks 22.7 22.1 19.0 20.6 24.0 21.9 23.0 22.9
Re-employed, % 72.6 74.9 76.3 78.6 73.5 78.1 72.2 74.4
Next job for re-employed
Public sector, % 27.0 25.5 42.5 43.1 37.5 33.1 33.5 32.8
Private sector, % 73.0 74.3 57.5 56.7 62.5 66.6 66.5 67.0
Duration, weeks 46.0 42.3 55.1 53.1 55.1 51.5 53.8 51.0
Monthly wage, Euros 2,156 2,094 2,177 2,119 2,164 2,094 2,174 2,133
100 x (New / old wage) 95.6 94.4 97.2 96.7 97.3 96.6 97.5 97.4
Number of observations 11,160 14,313 6,990 7,951 8,909 10,972 51,849 63,371
Notes: The pre-reform period (Pre) include unemployment spells that started 20012002 before Sep-
tember 13, 2002, and the post-reform period (Post) include the spells started in 20032004.
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treatment group, whereas the corresponding decline is close to four weeks for the two
control groups (3.5 and 3.7 weeks). These between-group diﬀerences are consistent with
a small positive eﬀect of potential beneﬁt duration on the wage and job duration of the
next job, even though such evidence is not easily seen in the noisy monthly time series
in ﬁgure 5. Overall it seems that the unemployed found relatively good jobs compared
to their previous jobs, which may not be very surprising given that a large share of them
returned to the same employer, possibly to perform the same job.
For comparison purposes we report sample means also for a wider sample by dropping
the restriction on the number of contribution weeks in columns 7 and 8. It turns out
that our estimation sample is very similar in terms of most background characteristics to
all unemployed of the same age group who lost their jobs in the same period, albeit the
treatment group includes a relatively high share of health care and social work employees
from the public sector. These workers are quite a speciﬁc group as they often enter
unemployment in June and then return to the same employer after the summer. We keep
them in the main analysis but show that dropping them (i.e. the spells started in June)
has no impact on the results.
5 Econometric analysis
In the previous section, we show that the unemployment inﬂow was stable at the time
of the refrom, the distributions of contribution weeks before and after the reform were
almost identical, and the changes in the background characteristics over time were small
and similar for all groups. All these ﬁndings suggest that the reform did not aﬀect the
unemployment inﬂow. By implication, the reform provides a source of exogenous variation
for the length of the beneﬁt entitlement periods.
5.1 A grouping estimator
Consider the model
Yit = α + βDit + εit, (1)
where Yit is an outcome (e.g. the duration of the unemployment spell) andDit is the length
of the entitlement period in weeks at the start of the unemployment spell for a worker
i who becomes unemployed at time t. The potential beneﬁt duration is a deterministic
function of the number of unused beneﬁt weeks from the previous unemployment spell
Rit and the number of contribution weeks Hit:
Dit = Rit + 1 {Hit ≥ ct} (100−Rit) , (2)
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where ct is the threshold value for the employment condition which equals 43 before the
2003 reform, and 34 after that. Since both Rit and Hit reﬂect past labor market outcomes,
they are likely to be correlated with εit, in which case Dit is endogenous in equation (1). If
Rit and Hit were observed without error, we could overcome the endogeneity problem by
controlling for their direct eﬀects in the regression of Yit on Dit because all the remaining
variation in Dit would then be driven by the 2003 reform. However, as pointed out
previously, we only observe a noisy measure of Hit.
Instead we adopt an instrumental variables (IV) approach based on classifying the
individuals into groups that were aﬀected diﬀerently by the 2003 reform. Suppose that
the error term can be decomposed as
E (εit |g, t) = λg + µt, (3)
where g indexes groups. Under this assumption, the causal eﬀect of β can be consistently
estimated from the grouped data equation
Y gt = α + βDgt + λg + µt + ugt, (4)
where Y gt and Dgt denote sample means for group g at time t, and the error term ugt
is mean-independent of Dgt. The common trend assumption in equation (3) states that
diﬀerences in average outcomes across groups conditional on the potential beneﬁt dura-
tion do not change over time. In addition, the potential beneﬁt duration must change
diﬀerently across groups over time.
It should be stressed that the weighted least squares (WLS) estimator of β using the
group sizes as weights can be interpreted as an IV estimator. To see this note that instead
of applying WLS to the grouped data we can obtain numerically identical results from
individual-level data as follows: ﬁrst regress by ordinary least squares (OLS) potential
beneﬁt durations Dit on the group dummies interacted with the time dummies, and then
regress the outcomes Yit on the predicted values of Dit from the ﬁrst stage along with
the time and group dummies (see e.g. Blundell et al. 1998). Under assumption (3) the
group/time interactions have no direct eﬀect on the outcome and thus they can be used
as instruments for the potential beneﬁt duration.
We still need to choose the groups. One possibility is to use the three broad contri-
bution week groups we used in the descriptive analysis. In doing so, we would ignore
heterogeneity in the eﬀect of the reform on potential beneﬁt duration arising from dif-
ferent UI histories. As an example, a worker in the treatment group with 90 weeks of
unused UI beneﬁts from the previous unemployment spell can qualify for 10 extra weeks
of beneﬁts due to the reform whereas a worker who exhausted his or her beneﬁts in the
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past can qualify for 100 extra weeks. For those aﬀected by the reform the counterfactual
beneﬁt entitlement equals the number of unused UI weeks from the previous spell, which
is observed in our data. By taking into account the counterfactual beneﬁt entitlement, we
can increase the statistical power of the analysis. Thus, in addition to the contribution
weeks, we group the data also according to the number of unused UI days from the previ-
ous spell. One category contains workers who exhausted their beneﬁts in the past. Those
with at least some unused UI days are split into twenty roughly equal-sized categories.
Based on three categories for contribution weeks and 21 categories for unused UI days we
obtain 63 distinct groups.
5.2 Baseline results
We begin by illustrating the IV grouping estimator graphically. For each of the 63 groups
we calculate the average potential beneﬁt duration and average outcomes of the unem-
ployment spell before and after the reform. The idea is to compare the changes in the
outcomes to the changes in the potential beneﬁt duration across groups. Figure 6 plots
within-group changes in the outcome variables against the changes in the potential beneﬁt
durations. For the majority of the groups, including the groups of workers with 3442
contribution weeks who have close to 100 weeks of unused UI beneﬁts, the change in the
potential beneﬁt duration is small. These groups are packed around a change of about ﬁve
weeks in the potential beneﬁt duration. Despite the small increase in the average beneﬁt
duration within these groups, the unemployment spells are slightly shorter on average
and larger shares of workers found a new job in the post-reform period due to better
macroeconomic conditions in the later years. At the same time the average duration and
wage of the next job declined pointing to declining match quality.
Changes in the potential beneﬁt duration are by far largest for the groups of workers
with 3442 contribution weeks who have none or only few unused UI weeks. These are
located on the right-hand side of the graphs. Unlike in the other groups, unemployment
spells became clearly longer in these groups. The change in the re-employment rate does
not diﬀer notably from other groups, but the post-unemployment outcomes may have
evolved slightly better than in other groups, albeit the diﬀerences are rather small.
The slope of the WLS regression line in ﬁgure 6a suggests that one additional week
of UI beneﬁts increases the expected duration of unemployment by 0.17 weeks, which
corresponds to an elasticity of 0.61.7 The eﬀect on the re-employment probability is very
7The elasticity is approximated as 0.17× 68/19 where 0.17 is the slope of the regression line, and 68
is the average potential beneﬁt duration and 19 is the average unemployment duration in the pre-reform
period for workers with 3442 contribution weeks who did not meet the employment condition (i.e. we
drop misclassiﬁed workers who qualiﬁed for 100 weeks of UI beneﬁts according to the UI records). Other
elasticities in the text are computed in the same way.
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small and only marginally signiﬁcant. The longer beneﬁt period may thus improve labor
market attachment: an unemployed worker entitled to beneﬁts for a long time may be
less likely to leave the labor force and hence more likely to ﬁnd a job. However, part
of this eﬀect on the re-employment probability can be mechanical as we analyze the
compensated spells of unemployment. Those individuals who exhaust their UI beneﬁts
but do not qualify for means-tested labor market support drop out of the sample regardless
of whether or not they continue their job search. For these individuals a longer beneﬁt
period lengthens the follow-up period by postponing the day of beneﬁt exhaustion. The
implied elasticity is 0.04, which appears to be approximately the same as the regression
slope.
There is some evidence of positive impacts on the quality of the next job: one extra
week of beneﬁts is estimated to lead to an increase of 2.9 Euros in the expected monthly
wage and to an increase of 0.15 weeks in the expected job duration.8 Both of these eﬀects
are statistically signiﬁcant but much smaller than the eﬀect on the expected unemploy-
ment duration. The elasticity of the post-unemployment wage is only 0.09 and that of
the job duration is 0.19.
Table 2 reports results from individual-level regressions. For comparison purposes we
also report two sets of OLS estimates. In model 1 we simply regress the outcome on
the number of remaining UI weeks and year dummies, ignoring the endogeneity problem
entirely. The results from this model suggest a very attractive policy option: by providing
UI beneﬁts for a longer period, the policy makers could reduce the average time spent in
unemployment and increase the share of the re-employed while helping the unemployed
to ﬁnd better jobs in terms of both wage and job duration. Unfortunately these estimates
are severely biased. Because workers entitled to longer periods of beneﬁts worked more
and collected UI beneﬁts for fewer weeks in the past, they are generally more employable
than others and, therefore, more likely to ﬁnd a good job quickly despite their longer
beneﬁt periods.
In model 2 we add a large array of control variables, including group dummies that
control for the eﬀects of (measured) contribution weeks and unused UI weeks from the
previous spell. The inclusion of the group dummies mitigates but does not eliminate
the endogeneity problem. The results in this case imply that one additional week of UI
beneﬁts increases the expected unemployment duration by 0.07 week. The results for
post-unemployment match quality are somewhat mixed: a longer beneﬁt period seems to
increase the next wage but reduce the job duration, though the size of the former eﬀect is
very small and the latter eﬀect is only marginally signiﬁcant. Except for the eﬀect on the
8When analysing the eﬀects on the post-unemployment outcomes, we use only observations on re-
employed workers who could be a selective group. However, this does not seem a signiﬁcant problem as
the eﬀect on the re-employment probability is typically very close to zero.
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Table 2: Estimates for the eﬀect of potential UI beneﬁt duration
OLS estimates IV estimates
Without
controls
With
controls
Without
controls
With
controls
N Mean (1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment duration 60,295 19.0 -0.047** 0.069*** 0.167*** 0.155***
(0.019) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020)
Re-employment probability 60,295 76.3 0.156*** 0.010 0.043* 0.050**
(0.016) (0.010) (0.025) (0.022)
Re-employment wage 45,532 2177 1.729*** 0.966*** 2.922*** 1.958**
(0.274) (0.295) (0.972) (0.936)
Duration of next job 45,532 55.1 0.193*** -0.037* 0.148*** 0.143**
(0.040) (0.019) (0.056) (0.059)
Notes: Mean is for workers with 3442 contribution weeks in the pre-reform period. Table reports the
coeﬃcient on the number of the UI weeks the worker is entitled to at the beginning of the unemployment
spell. Interactions between group dummies and post-reform dummy are used as instruments in models
3 and 4. All models include year dummies. Models 2, 3 and 4 include group dummies. The set of
additional controls include gender, age, education, occupation, the calendar month of unemployment
entry, the duration and wage of the previous job, the sector of the previous employer, the reason for
termination of the previous job, the fraction of time spent in employment in the past 12 months and
1224 months, and the fraction of time spent on UI beneﬁts in the past 12 months and 1224 months.
The standard errors clustered at the group level are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%
and * 10%.
job duration, the OLS estimates are similar to the slope estimates in ﬁgure 6 but smaller
in absolute value.
Our preferred speciﬁcations are models 3 and 4 where the group/post-reform interac-
tions are used as instruments for the potential beneﬁt duration. Apart from including year
dummies (and a diﬀerent way of obtaining standard errors), model 3 corresponds to the
grouped data regression shown in ﬁgure 6 and therefore the results are almost identical.
By comparing the estimates from models 3 and 4 we see that adding a large number of
control variables makes little diﬀerence. The eﬀect on the post-unemployment wage drops
by one-third but that was very small to start with. The eﬀects on match quality should
be interpreted with some caution as the potential selectivity of the re-employed group is
ignored. However, if we include also those who did not ﬁnd a new job in the analysis and
set their wage and job duration to zero, the results remain similar.
A consensus estimate of Tatsiramos and van Ours (2014) based on a survey of several
existing studies is that one extra week of UI beneﬁts prolongs average unemployment
duration approximately by 0.2 weeks, which is only marginally above our estimates of 0.16
and 0.17. The estimates of course vary around this value across countries.9 One extra
9Also the deﬁnition of the unemployment spell varies across studies: it may refer to the duration of
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week of beneﬁts has been estimated to increase the expected unemployment duration by
0.08 weeks in the U.S. (Card and Levine 2000), 0.04 to 0.42 weeks in Austria (Lalive et al.
2006; Card et al. 2007; Lalive 2008), 0.1 to 0.13 weeks in Germany (Schmieder et al. 2012)
and 0.18 to 0.58 weeks in Slovenia (van Ours and Vodopivec 2006).
Our estimates imply that longer beneﬁt periods may lead to better job matches after
unemployment, at least when measured by the expected duration of the next job. This
ﬁnding is in line with the studies by Centeno and Novo (2009) and Nekoei and Weber
(2017), which ﬁnd small positive eﬀects on re-employment wages in Portugal and Austria,
respectively. On the other hand, most other studies, such as Lalive (2007) and Card et al.
(2007) for Austria, Le Barbanchon (2016) for France, and Schmieder et al. (2016) for
Germany, ﬁnd negative or no eﬀects of longer beneﬁt duration on match quality.
5.3 Results for subgroups
In tables 3 and 4 we report IV estimates for various subgroups from the speciﬁcation
without control variables, i.e. the results correspond to model 3 in table 2. The eﬀect of
potential beneﬁt duration on the expected duration of unemployment is roughly of the
same size for both sexes, but only women beneﬁt from longer beneﬁt periods in terms
of better job matches afterward. The eﬀect on the re-employment wage is essentially
the same for both sexes but less precisely estimated for men. The longer beneﬁt period
increases the probability of job ﬁnding only for women.
Older workers seem to more responsive to potential beneﬁt duration, but they are
also more likely to beneﬁt from longer search periods in terms of a higher re-employment
probability. The eﬀect of potential beneﬁt duration on match quality is very similar across
the age groups. The eﬀect on unemployment duration does not vary notably by education
or by sector of the previous employer. However, only less educated workers and private-
sector workers seem to ﬁnd better matches due to longer beneﬁt periods. In the public
sector the wage distribution is more compressed and the wage rate is mainly determined
by formal education and work experience in a given occupation. As such, longer search
periods are less likely to lead better job oﬀers in the public sector.
One question of interest is how the eﬀect of potential beneﬁt duration varies over the
business cycle. We cannot address this question directly because our data covers a relative
short period of time when the macroeconomic conditions were rather stable. There are
however large regional diﬀerences in labor demand conditions. To study the sensitivity
of behavioral responses to local labor market conditions, we use register data from the
Ministry of Employment and the Economy on all open vacancies and all unemployed job
seekers at the public employment service and compute average vacancy/unemployed (VU)
registered unemployment, the time of UI beneﬁt receipt or the time until the next job.
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ratios over the years 20012004 for all municipalities. This ratio serves as a measure of
labor market tightness. Then we split our estimation sample into three groups according
to labor market tightness in the individual's living region: one-forth of sample members
live in municipalities where the VU ratio was 0.055 or less, one half in municipalities
where the VU ratio between 0.055 and 0.105, and one forth in municipalities where the
VU ratio exceeds 0.105.10 The results of this exercise are shown in columns 1 to 3 of
table 4. The eﬀect of potential beneﬁt duration on unemployment duration does not vary
much with labor market tightness. It is marginally stronger for those living in the most
depressed regions, but they are also the only group for whom longer beneﬁt periods also
increase the likelihood of ﬁnding a new job.
Column 4 to 6 of table 4 report the estimates for people who diﬀer in the level of the
UI beneﬁts. In this case, we drop from the sample those who were not entitled to UI
beneﬁts at the beginning of their unemployment spell (4.6% of all spells). It turns out
that UI recipients with the lowest beneﬁt levels (the ﬁrst quartile) are less responsive to
the length of beneﬁt period, although they seem to be the only ones who gain from longer
beneﬁts periods in terms of more stable post-unemployment jobs. Thus, from the point
of view of the society, an extension of the beneﬁt period would be relatively more costly
for workers eligible for higher beneﬁts as they would simply collect unemployed for longer
without ending up in better jobs later.
The ﬁnal set of estimates is for workers who diﬀer in the wage rate of their previous
job. The past monthly wage is available also for those who did not qualify for UI beneﬁts
at the time of unemployment entry, so that no spells are excluded this time. It also diﬀers
from the wage rate on which the UI beneﬁt is based. The latter is the average wage
during the contribution weeks for the employment condition. Thus it may be an average
of wages in several jobs, and for those who did not satisfy the employment condition at
the start of the current unemployment spell, it is not based on the most recent wage at all
but on the wages received before some previous unemployment spell. As seen in columns
7 to 9 of table 4, the eﬀect of potential beneﬁt duration on unemployment duration is
not sensitive with respect to the wage level. However, longer beneﬁt periods seem to help
workers who received a high wage before unemployment to ﬁnd a new high-paid job. By
contrast, those who used to be paid less before tend to ﬁnd more stable jobs due to longer
beneﬁt periods.
In summary, the eﬀect of one extra week of UI beneﬁts on unemployment duration is
relatively similar for all considered subgroups, being always statistically signiﬁcant and
varying between 0.10 and 0.22 weeks. Workers aged 45 and over and those with relatively
10Surprisingly, the average unemployment duration and the re-employment probability of the sample
members do not vary much across these regions whereas the average wage and duration of the next job
increase with the VU ratio.
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high UI beneﬁts may be somewhat more responsive to changes in the length of the beneﬁt
period. The eﬀect on quality of next job varies more across groups. Women, low educated
and private-sector employees are the most likely to beneﬁt in terms of higher wages or
more stable jobs from the longer job search periods that longer beneﬁt periods enable.
5.4 Robustness checks
Table 5 shows several robustness checks for the IV estimates. The baseline results from
model 4 with control variables are reproduced in column 1. Excluding a somewhat speciﬁc
group of workers who became unemployed in June has very little eﬀect (model 2 vs. model
1). Likewise, if we drop those entering unemployment in 2002, as some of them may have
changed their behavior if still unemployed at the time when the reform became public
knowledge, the results remain stable (model 3 vs. model 1). Dropping the spells that
started with receipt of labor market subsidy kills the eﬀects on the post-unemployment
outcomes by cutting their magnitude by half but hardly aﬀects the impact on the un-
employment duration and re-employment probability. Note that excluding these spells
leads to a somewhat selective sample as a slightly higher share of the pre-reform spells
are excluded because it was easier to qualify for UI beneﬁts in the post-reform period.
In models 5 to 8 we relax the common trend assumption by allowing a distinct linear
trend for each of the 63 groups. These estimates are noisier but it is reassuring to ﬁnd that
the point estimates do not change much from the baseline results. The eﬀect on the un-
employment duration decreases marginally whereas the eﬀects on the post-unemployment
outcomes remain similar but lose their statistical signiﬁcance due to higher standard er-
rors. The only exception is the eﬀect on the re-employment probability which increases
to fourfold (model 5 vs. model 1). The point estimate of 0.217 in this case implies an
elasticity of 0.19 for the re-employment probability. This estimate is also robust with
respect to the sample restrictions (models 6 to 8).
6 Concluding remarks
We found that one additional week of UI beneﬁts increases the expected unemployment
duration by some 0.15 weeks, corresponding to an elasticity of 0.5. The estimated eﬀect
proved to be fairly similar across diﬀerent worker groups. Our results also imply a positive
eﬀect on the re-employment probability. Our baseline estimate is rather small with an
implied elasticity of 0.05, but the size of the eﬀect appears to be sensitive with respect to
the common trend assumption. Furhermore, our results indicate that one additional week
of UI beneﬁts increases the expected wage and duration of the next job by some 2 Euros
per month and 0.15 weeks respectively. The former eﬀect is very small but the latter eﬀect
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is economically signiﬁcant. Compared to the evidence from other countries that points
to very small (positive or negative) or nonexistent eﬀects on job quality, our ﬁndings
are broadly similar yet more positive. The main message for the Finnish government is
that the recent reductions of 20% and 40% in the maximum beneﬁt duration induce UI
recipients to ﬁnd new jobs more quickly but those jobs are shorter on average and thereby
re-employed workers may also return to unemployment more quickly.
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